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Résumé: Les permis de conduire à points sont aujourd'hui très largement utilisés pour faire respecter 
les politiques de sécurité routière, avec toutefois des mises en oeuvre diverses selon les pays 
et parfois à l'intérieur d'un même pays. Comme toute sanction non-monétaire, priver les 
contrevenants de leur permis permet aux autorités publiques de retirer de la route les individus 
dangereux et aussi de dissuader les conducteurs normaux d'enfreindre le code de la route. 
Nous analysons les caractéristiques souhaitables des mécanismes de permis à points et, en 
particulier, nous étudions s'ils devraient inclure des clauses de récupération des points perdus 
et des périodes probatoires. Nous envisageons également la possibilité d'un retrait immédiat 
du permis de conduire pour les infractions les plus graves. 
 
Abstract: Point-record driving licences are widely used nowadays to enforce road legislations, but with 
diverse implementations from one country to the other, and even within a country. As any 
non-monetary sanction, depriving offenders from their licences allows the Government to 
incapacitate dangerous individuals and also to deter normal drivers to infringe road 
legislation. We investigate the desirable features of point-record licence mechanisms, and in 
particular, if they should allow drivers to redeem their points and/or include probationary 
periods. We also consider the possibility of an immediate withdrawal of the driving licence 
for very serious offences. 
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1 Introduction
Road safety is one of the major public health concerns nowadays. According
to the World Health Organization, more than one million people around the
world die in road crashes and twenty millions are injured or disabled by road-
traﬃc injuries each year. This is a big challenge for developing countries,
but also for the OECD countries, where more than 116,000 people died in
car crashes in 2000.
As early as the mid seventies, the benefits of legislations focusing on
structural improvements and on inboard devices of active and passive safety
were questioned by statistical analysis.1 Accordingly, the basic tenet among
OECD countries on the cause of road insecurity has progressively evolved
from infrastructure improvement and vehicle safety to the monitoring of
drivers’ behaviors and punishment for driving oﬀences. In particular, mea-
sures taken in Britain, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden have result
in a cut of the fatality rate in road crashes to less than 7 per 100,000 of
the population in 2000, while the average figure for all OECD countries
(except Mexico and Slovak Republic) is 12.5 deaths per 100,000. Strong
political commitment and the setting of specific safety targets in relation
to speed, alcohol and the wearing of seat-belts form the basis of these suc-
cessful measures. This demonstrates that at least in the OCDE countries,
road insecurity nowadays is more the result of drivers’ behaviors than the
consequence of the poor state of roads and vehicles.
Punishments for the minor infringements of road regulations belong to
two categories: monetary sanctions (fines and insurance payment) and li-
cence deprivation (suspension or withdrawal). At first sight, we may think
that monetary penalties should be preferred by governments. Indeed, the
social costs of monetary penalties can be considered as negligible, since
taxpayers benefit from the revenues generated by these policies, while the
revocation of a driving licence does not benefit to another individual in so-
ciety. However, there are two reasons justifying that governments do not
limit their policy to monetary sanctions only. First, drivers may be insol-
vent, which limits the maximum amount governments may charge oﬀenders
and thus the power of the incentives provided by the policy. Second, drivers
belong to a heterogeneous group of individuals, some being opportunistic,
the others chronically reckless. Road safety legislations are thus impeded by
both a moral hazard problem (to deter opportunistic drivers to infringe road
1See the work of Peltzman (1975) on the eﬀect of the Road Safety Acts of the mid-
sixties, and Blomquist (1988). These results are challenged by Graham et Garber (1984).
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regulations) and an adverse selection problem (spotting and incapacitating
the individuals who are intrinsically reckless). While monetary sanctions
may reveal eﬃcient for deterrence purposes, only incapacitation strategies
like licence revocation can diminish the number of chronic reckless individ-
uals on the road.2
To avoid ineﬃcient withdrawals, many countries have adopted point-
record driving licence mechanisms. Their implementations are widely dif-
ferent from one country to another, even from one state to another in the
US, but their general operating principles are the same. Depending on their
seriousness, infringements are punished by the loss of one or several points,
delaying the withdrawal of the licence to the exhaustion of the driver’s point-
credit.3
While they share similar general principles, the diversity of the systems is
surprising. In the U.S., almost all states have adopted point-record systems
but the total credit of points granted to drivers and the number of points
removed for the same violation diﬀer widely from one state to the other
(from two to six points in Wisconsin, one to twelve in Maryland, one or two
in California). Once the point credit is exhausted, the driver may have to
go to an interview and an analyst decides which is the best decision to take
against the oﬀender, from a warning letter to the withdrawal of the licence.
In other countries (like France since 2002), the withdrawal of the licence is
automatic once the point-record credit is exhausted.
We propose to analyze point-record systems to exhibit the desirable fea-
tures they must include to enlarge social gains. We investigate and compare
several instances of eﬀective mechanisms, i.e. point-record mechanisms in-
ducing individuals to drive sanely whatever their records. We suppose that
cautious driving increases the social welfare while reckless driving dimin-
ishes it. In addition to be not too costly to administer, the optimal system
must allow the Government to remove reckless individuals from the roads
while inducing normal ones to drive carefully. In other words, point-record
driving licences play a double role: they are at the same time a screening
2For the use of nonmonetary sanctions as deterrent and incapacitation devices, see
Shavell (1987a and 1987b) and Kaplow (1990). See also Polinsky and Shavell (2000) for a
presentation of the economic theory of public enforcement of law.
3In some states of the US or in Canada, drivers may have “demerit points” on their
record. In such a system, a driver begins with zero demerit point and accumulates demerit
points for convictions. Once the number of demerit points has reached a threshold, the
licence is suspended for a given period. We here consider the system - most frequently
used in Europe - where drivers lose points due to convictions for certain traﬃc oﬀences
and they lose their licences when their point record is exhausted. Of course, both systems
are equivalent.
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and incapacitating device and a deterrence mechanism. In what follows
we analyze this double function within a model with two types of drivers
called reckless drivers and normal drivers. Reckless drivers (e.g. alcoholics
or persons showing a propensity for road aggressiveness) are not sensitive to
the incentives of the point-record system because their disutility of careful
driving is very large. On the contrary, normal drivers abide by the road
regulations if the incentives to do so are large enough.
As an incapacitating device, point-record driving licences act in two
ways. Firstly, the drivers who have lost all their points may have to pass an
exam to get their licence back (after the compulsory deprivation period) and
some reckless drivers (e.g. mentally unstable persons or chronic alcoholics)
may be spotted and prevented from driving. Secondly, reckless drivers will
lose their points more rapidly than normal drivers, and the proportion of
reckless individuals among the drivers will be reduced by this selection mech-
anism. Point-record driving licences also deter normal drivers to infringe the
Highway Code even if this is costly in psychological or monetary terms (e.g.
not to drive faster than the speed allowed by law, even if you are late with
an important business meeting!).
We show that these incapacitating and deterring functions and the cost
of driving licences examinations lead to an optimal system characterized by
the number of points that should be initially attributed to a driver and by
the length of the deprivation period for those who have lost their last point.
This optimal system depends on several parameters, including the propor-
tion of reckless drivers in the population, the probability for each type to
commit a road infraction and their probability of success at the driving li-
cence examination as well as the administrative costs of these examinations.
We also show that the government may have reasons to forbear from imple-
menting the optimal point-record mechanism: we analyze the nature of this
diﬃculty and we establish that the optimal system requires the commitment
of the government to withdraw the driving licences of oﬀenders when the
proportion of reckless drivers is low.
Several features may be included in road regulations. One possibility
investigated is the “redemptive” system, where drivers can redeem points by
driving carefully, i.e. after a given period without driving oﬀence. Without
redemption, drivers can only loose their points. With these rather tough
systems, even careful (but not infallible) individuals end up deprived of
their licence. Like other drivers, their are entering a punishment phase
the length of which may depend on their ability to pass health, driving
and written examinations. Compared to tougher systems, we show that
redemptive point-record licences increase the social welfare.
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New drivers (particularly young people) may also be subject to special
treatments. In particular, they may have to demonstrate their ability to
drive during a probationary period before being granted a full credit of
points. This transient phase helps the authorities to discriminate between
dangerous and normal drivers. It may be completed with a reduced-credit
licence for beginners who fail to cross the transient phase without indict-
ment. We analyze such a system and demonstrate that it increases the
social welfare. On the whole, systems including probationary periods and
reduced-credit licences allow the government to incapacitate more frequently
dangerous drivers because they strengthen the screening eﬃciency of point-
record driving licences.
As road infringements are diverse in their nature (speed, aggressive driv-
ing, poor state of the car, ...) and may be more or less acute depending
of their intensity, we also investigate the desirable features of point-record
licence systems when the seriousness of road infringements varies. In partic-
ular, we establish conditions under which it is socially optimal to withdraw
the licences of drivers who commit very serious driving oﬀences. This is the
case when the most serious driving oﬀences are strongly informative on the
oﬀender’s behavior. Indeed, in such a case, the social benefits of incapaci-
tating reckless drivers prevail over the cost of evicting some normal drivers
who (say because of a momentary lack of attention) may have committed a
very severe infringement.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. In Section 2 we set up the
basic model, we establish the existence of an optimal point-record mecha-
nism and we derive its most important properties. Section 3 considers more
elaborated versions of the point-record mechanisms, including redemptive
systems and probationary licence system. Section 4 extends the model to
the case where the seriousness of driving oﬀences varies and contemplates
the option of an immediate withdrawal of the driver’s licence for very serious
oﬀences. All proofs are gathered in the appendix.
2 The basic model
Let e be the driver’s eﬀort. For simplicity, we assume that e may only
take two values, either 0 or 1. We distinguish between two kinds of drivers,
namely “normal” drivers, who may exert an eﬀort e = 1 (i.e. driving care-
fully) provided that the point-record mechanism gives adequate incentives
(in such a case, we will say that the record mechanism is eﬀective), and high-
risk “reckless” drivers, whose driving eﬀort is always e = 0. With eﬀective
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regulations, there is a one-to-one correspondence between drivers’ eﬀorts and
types, normal drivers always exerting an eﬀort e = 1 and reckless drivers
choosing e = 0. We shall thus refer to the drivers’ type by calling them
type-e drivers. Eﬀort determines the probability that a driver infringes road
regulations and more precisely the probability pedt she is caught committing
an infraction during an infinitesimal length of time dt, with p0 > p1 > 0. A
type-e driver is thus caught violating road regulations during a time-period
of length t with probability
R t
0 pee
−peτdτ = 1− e−pet, which corresponds to
an expected time 1/pe between two punishments for road infringement. In
other words, the time period between two infractions follows an exponential
law with parameter pe. When convicted, the driver’s point-credit is reduced
by 1. A fresh record entails a N points credit, which is also the maximum
a record can reach. It may be reduced to 0, which leads to the withdrawal
of the driver’s license. Driving yields an instantaneous private gross utility
v¯ to the driver, while exerting an eﬀort e = 1 entails a disutility k to nor-
mal drivers, with v¯ > k > 0. v¯ and k are in monetary units, i.e. v¯ − k
measures the economic private surplus of normal drivers when they drive
carefully. Implicitly, the cost of providing eﬀort is very large for reckless
drivers, so that they never exert eﬀort whatever the point-record system.
Drivers maximize the expected discounted sum of their lifetime utility.
Punishment in this driver-record system corresponds to the withdrawal
of the licence. An exhausted credit may be reinstated after time-period T ,
assuming that the driver qualifies for a new licence, i.e. she passes vision-
health, written and road examinations and possibly an interview and psy-
chological tests. Examinations are a screening device: a type-e driver passes
with probability ηe with 0 < η0 ≤ η1 ≤ 1. A driver who fails has to wait
for another time period T before taking the exam one more time. Successful
candidates are reinstated to a N points fresh record. Utility is null when
drivers are deprived of their licence.
2.1 Incentives for careful driving
The derivation of the incentive constraint for careful driving proceeds in two
steps. In the first step, we compute the lifetime expected utility of a normal
driver who chooses to drive carefully (i.e. who chooses e = 1) as a function
of her point-record. In the second step, we derive the conditions under which
the driver has no advantage in deviating from this behavior whatever her
point-record.
With a current record of n > 0 points, the expected utility un of a normal
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driver exerting an eﬀort e = 1 is given by
un =
Z +∞
0
p1e
−p1τ
µZ τ
0
(v¯ − k)e−rtdt+ e−rτun−1
¶
dτ (1)
where τ is the (unknown) date at which the driver is caught committing an
infraction, and r is the discount rate. The driver’s expected lifetime utility is
the discounted sum of her immediate satisfaction of driving, i.e. (v¯− k)e−rt
at time t, with t varying from the present (t = 0) until the date τ where she
is convicted, loses a point and thus gets the present value of her expected
future utility with a (n− 1)-point record, e−rτun−1. Date τ depends on the
way she is driving : by exerting an eﬀort e = 1 the probability she is not
convicted at this date is e−p1τ , which decreases over an infinitesimal period
of length dt by p1e
−p1τdt. Integrating (1) yields the recursive expression
un =
v¯ − k + p1un−1
r + p1
(2)
This is easily interpreted by considering the equivalent relationship
run = v¯ − k − p1(un − un−1) (3)
which states that the instantaneous driver’s welfare run is composed of two
terms: her immediate driving surplus v¯ − k and the expected change in her
utility level due to the change in her point-record −p1(un − un−1).4
Denote by u0 the expected utility of a normal driver who has just been
deprived of her licence (i.e. who has just lost her last point). A type-e driver
is reinstated after punishment period θT with probability ηe(1 − ηe)θ−1,
where θ ∈ N∗ . Hence, for a normal driver we have
u0 = uN
∞X
θ=1
η1(1− η1)θ−1e−θrT
which gives
u0 = σ1(T )uN (4)
with
σe(T ) ≡
ηee−rT
1− (1− ηe)e−rT
for e = 0 or 1.
4The analogy with asset valuation methods is highlighting: The point-record licence
may be viewed as an asset with current value u which yields an instantaneous revenue ru,
comprised of dividends, v¯ − k, and the expected change in the asset’s value E[du].
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Equation (2) together with (4) allows us to determine the utility of normal
drivers depending of their records. These utility levels are given in the
following result and are depicted in Figure 1.
Lemma 1. The utility of a n-point normal driver always exerting eﬀort
e = 1 is given by
un =
v¯ − k
r
·
1− bn 1− σ1(T )
1− bNσ1(T )
¸
(5)
where b ≡ p1/(r + p1) < 1.
As intuition suggests, the driver’s utility given by (5) increases with her
point-record. The negative part of the bracketed term in (5) captures the
eﬀect of the point-record system. Were drivers allowed to drive every period
whatever their records, careful drivers would have a discounted utility of
(v¯ − k)/r. This is the case when n goes to infinity in (5). With the point-
record system, this utility level is reduced due to the fact that the driver will
eventually be deprived of her licence. This prospect depends on her record
though, and is more acute the lower the credit.
A point-record mechanism is said to be eﬀective if it is (weakly) optimal
for a normal driver to choose e = 1 whatever her record (i.e. for all n =
1, 2, . . . , N). Consider the expected utility u˜n(ε) of a n-point driver who
chooses not to exert any eﬀort during the time interval [0, ε], ε > 0 (as long
as she’s not caught committing an infringement during this period) and then
to drive safely for the rest of her life. It is given by
u˜n(ε) =
Z ε
0
p0e
−p0τ
µZ τ
0
v¯e−rtdt+ e−rτun−1
¶
dτ + e−p0ε
µZ ε
0
v¯e−rtdt+ e−rεun
¶
(6)
where the first term corresponds to her expected utility in case she is caught
at any date 0 ≤ τ ≤ ε and loses one point, while the second is her expected
utility if she’s not caught during period ε. Integrating (6) gives
u˜n(ε) = un − [1− e−(p0+r)ε]
run − v¯ + p0(un − un−1)
p0 + r
(7)
The point-record mechanism is eﬀective if un ≥ u˜n(ε) for all n = 1, 2, . . . , N
and all ε ≥ 0. This is the case if the last term of (7) is positive for all ε > 0,
which, using (3), leads to the condition
v¯ − k − p1(un − un−1) ≥ v¯ − p0(un − un−1) (8)
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for all n = 1, 2, . . . , N . Interpretation of (8) is straightforward: multiplying
both sides by dt > 0, the left-hand side corresponds to rundt which is the
utility reward over the time interval [0, dt] for a n-points normal driver who
makes eﬀort any time, while the right hand side is her utility gain if she
deviates during [0, dt] and reverts to careful driving in the following periods.
Rearranging terms allows us to rewrite (8) as
un − un−1 ≥
k
p0 − p1
(9)
Using (5), one checks easily that un−un−1 decreases as n increases. The
point-record mechanism is thus eﬀective if normal drivers with fresh records
(i.e. with n = N) are induced to drive carefully. This leads to the following
incentive compatibility condition
v¯ − k
k
p0 − p1
p1
≥ (1 + r/p1)
N − σ1(T )
1− σ1(T )
≡ ψ(N,T ) (10)
with ψ0N > 0 and ψ
0
T < 0. As expected, the greater the number of oﬀences
before the revocation of the licence, the harder it is to maintain incentives
for careful driving, while increasing the length of the punishment period
increases the incentive power of the point-record mechanism. We assume
v¯ − k
k
p0 − p1
p1
≥ 1 + r/p1 = ψ(1,+∞) (11)
In words, normal drivers are deterred to infringe road regulation if they are
deprived of their licence after the first oﬀence and they cannot be reinstated.
2.2 Welfare analysis
The social welfare is defined as the sum of expected life-time utility over the
whole population net of the external costs and external benefits of driving.
These costs and benefits include the outlays for private insurance and social
security which are related to the frequency and the gravity of accidents and
injuries, as well as the costs of emergency services, the additional time travel
spent by the other motorists, the workplace disruptions and the cost of legal
proceedings in case of an accident. The diﬀerence between private and social
costs of driving also arises from the diﬀerence between the private value of
life (which can be measured by the drivers’ willingness to pay to avoid the
risks that will result in one less death) and the social value of life which
reflects the marginal productivity of labor as well as the external productive
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eﬀects entailed by the premature death of a skilled worker. External benefits
also include the eﬀect of individuals’ mobility on productivity as well as on
the private welfare of other individuals. The net external costs of incapaci-
tating a driver is presumably positive, because of the induced eﬀects on the
productive system of the lower mobility of suspended drivers, although less
mileage also entails external benefits due to the decrease in road congestion
or to the reduction in pollution.5 To complete the definition of the social
costs and benefits of driving, we must also include the licence examination
cost.
As shown in the appendix and stated formally in the following lemma,
it is possible to derive a rather simple expression of the social welfare at
steady states reflecting all these costs and benefits, assuming that there is
a constant proportion λ of reckless drivers in the population, 0 < λ < 1.
Steady states are characterized by the qe proportion of type-e individuals
who are allowed to drive, i.e. who have at least one point, which depends
on the driving licence system implemented by the Government.
Lemma 2. At steady states, the social welfare is given by
W = λ[q0w0 + (1− q0)(w¯ − c/T )] + (1− λ)[q1w1 + (1− q1)(w¯ − c/T )]
(12)
where w0, w1 and w¯ denote the discounted social surplus corresponding to
reckless driving, cautious driving and to the deprivation of the driving licence
respectively, and where c corresponds to the per applicant discounted cost of
licence examination.
The bracketed terms in (12) correspond to the expected social surplus
for each type, given the proportions of active and inactive drivers. For the
time being, we only consider eﬀective point-record mechanisms, but we will
show in a following section that they are indeed socially optimal. With such
mechanisms, the eﬀort level of normal drivers does not depend on n : it
is equal to e = 1 for all n = 1, ..., N . At steady states, normal drivers
and reckless drivers are evenly distributed among the N categories of active
drivers. We thus have
peqe/N = (1− qe)ηe/T for e = 0, 1. (13)
Indeed, during a period of length dt, a ηedt/T fraction of the suspended
type-e drivers pass examinations, while pedt type-e drivers belonging to
5On externalities in the economics of road safety, see Boyer and Dionne (1987).
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the 1-point record category, a 1/N fraction of the active type-e drivers,
are caught violating driving rules and are thus deprived of their licences.
Hence, with an eﬀective point-record mechanism, the proportion of type-e
individuals who are allowed to drive is given by
qe =
1
1 + peT/ηeN
(14)
Using (14), we can write the social welfare as a function of N and T :
W (N,T ) = λ
w0 − w¯ + c/T
1 + p0T/η0N
+ (1− λ)w1 − w¯ + c/T
1 + p1T/η1N
+ w¯ − c/T (15)
The optimal eﬀective driver-record mechanism maximizesW (N,T ) given
by (15) with respect to N in {1, 2, . . . } and T ≥ 0 subject to (10). We
shall characterize the optimal driving licence system under the following
assumptions
H 1. w0 < w¯ < w1.
H 2. λw0 + (1− λ)w1 > w¯.
H 3. c < T (w¯ − w0) where T = σ−11
µ
1− kr
v¯(p0 − p1)− kp0
¶
.
In words, H1 states that reckless driving is a bad for society that entails
net social costs w¯ − w0 while careful driving is a good, with corresponding
social surplus w1 − w¯. H2 means that the proportion of reckless drivers is
small enough for generalized driving prohibition to be a suboptimal policy.
It can be equivalently written as λ < λˆ ≡ (w1− w¯)/(w1−w0). Time period
T specified in H3 is deduced from binding (10) for N = 1.6 For any eﬀective
mechanism, we have T ≥ T . Hence, H3 implies w0 − w¯ + c/T < 0 for
any eﬀective mechanism, which insures that social welfare always increases
when the number of reckless drivers decreases.7 Under these assumptions,
it is possible to show that
Proposition 1. There exists an optimal eﬀective point-record mechanism
(N,T ) when c is lower than a threshold cˆ > 0. It is such that
ψ(N + 1, T ) >
v¯ − k
k
p0 − p1
p1
≥ ψ(N,T )
6We thus have ψ(1, T ) = (v¯ − k)(p0 − p1)/kp1. Using (11) and the definition of σ1(T )
shows that T exists and is uniquely defined.
7If c were very large, it would be preferable to increase the steady state proportion of
reckless individuals allowed to drive in order to reduce the examination costs. H3 is just
a convenient way to eliminate this uninteresting case.
11
Proposition 1 says that there exists an optimal eﬀective point-record
mechanism (N,T ) when the examination cost is not too large. It also says
that (N + 1, T ) is not eﬀective. In other words, N is the largest number
of points for which normal drivers decide to make eﬀort, given that the
length of the deprivation period is T . The intuition of these results is the
following. Let us first observe that W (N,T ) only depends on N/T when
c = 0 : in that case, unconstrained maximization of W gives N/T = x∗.
Indeed from (14), at a steady state, the number of individuals allowed to
drive increases with N/T . However, while the government wishes to increase
the number of normal drivers (by increasing N/T ), it would like to reduce
the number of reckless drivers (and thus decrease N/T ). Consequently, a
marginal increase in N/T entails a marginal social benefit associated to the
increased number of normal drivers, but also a marginal social cost due
to the increase in the number of reckless drivers. This trade oﬀ leads to
the optimal solution N/T = x∗. When c = 0, all eﬀective mechanisms
that satisfy (10) and N/T = x∗ are optimal. This indeterminacy of the
optimal mechanism clears up when c > 0. Indeed, in that case, increasing N
and T keeping N/T unchanged reduces the frequency of examinations (and
thus the per driver examination costs c/T decreases), while maintaining
the same number of active drivers for each type. This enhances the social
welfare. However, because of the time discounting, drivers are more severely
penalized by an increase in the deprivation period when T is low than when it
is large. Consequently when (10) is binding incentive compatibility requires
that N/T decreases when T increases. The optimal mechanism trades oﬀ
the disadvantages of moving away from N/T = x∗ and the advantages of
reducing the examination costs when T is increasing. When c is not too
large, it is suboptimal to increase indefinitely T and there exists an optimal
mechanism (N,T ), with T finite.
2.3 Optimality of eﬀective mechanisms
The result of the previous section is established under the assumption that
eﬀective point-record mechanisms are socially optimal. We show in this
section that this is actually the case if c is not too large. In fact, with
non-eﬀective point-record systems, normal drivers adopt a “trigger strategy”
which consists in exerting no eﬀort as long as their point-credit is larger than
a threshold level N∗, then driving carefully. Such a behavior ultimately
results in an increase in dangerous driving and produces no welfare gain
unless examinations are prohibitively costly. The government should thus
avoid to give a too large point allowance to drivers. We demonstrate formally
12
this statement in the following two propositions. We first establish that
normal drivers play a trigger strategy. We then demonstrate that any non-
eﬀective mechanism is dominated by an eﬀective point-record mechanism.
We first proceed by generalizing our approach to mechanisms that may
not be eﬀective. The lifetime discounted expected utility of a normal driver
with n points is given by (1) for eﬀective mechanism, but more generally we
have
un = max
½Z +∞
0
p1e
−p1τ
µZ τ
0
(v¯ − k)e−rtdt+ e−rτun−1
¶
dτ , (16)Z +∞
0
p0e
−p0τ
µZ τ
0
v¯e−rtdt+ e−rτun−1
¶
dτ
¾
which simplifies to
run = v¯ − p1(un − un−1)−min{k, (p0 − p1)(un − un−1)} (17)
upon integrating. With an eﬀective mechanism, the incentive condition (9)
ensures that the cost of exerting eﬀort, k, is lower that the cost of careless
driving in terms of expected lifetime utility loss, (p0−p1)(un−un−1). More
generally, a normal driver may adopt a state-dependent mixed strategy.
Denote by sn, 0 ≤ sn ≤ 1 the probability for a n-point normal driver to
choose e = 1. Given u0, equation (17) defines the sequence un recursively
as
un =



v¯ − k + p1un−1
r + p1
if un−1 < eu
v¯ + p0un−1
r + p0
if un−1 ≥ eu (18)
where
eu = v¯
r
− k(r + p0)
r(p0 − p1)
.
Normal drivers reach utility levels (18) by using the strategy sn = 1
for un−1 < eu, 0 ≤ sn ≤ 1 for un−1 = eu and sn = 0 for un−1 > eu. With
a non-eﬀective point-record mechanism (N,T ), there exists n in {1, ...,N}
such that sn = 0 is the only equilibrium strategy. Proposition 2 states that
normal drivers play a trigger strategy.
Proposition 2. For any point-record mechanism (N,T ) and any corre-
sponding equilibrium (s1, ..., sN), there exists N
∗ in {1, . . . , N} such that
sn = 1 for 1 ≤ n ≤ N∗ − 1, 0 ≤ sn ≤ 1 for n = N∗ and sn = 0 for
N∗ + 1 ≤ n ≤ N .
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Trigger strategies are thus optimal for normal drivers. They consist in
exerting no eﬀort as long as the point-credit is larger than the threshold level
N∗, playing a mixed strategy at n = N∗ and then driving carefully when n
is less than N∗. Eﬀective mechanisms correspond to the case N = N∗. The
next proposition establishes that eﬀective mechanisms are socially optimal.
Proposition 3. Any non-eﬀective point-record mechanism is strictly dom-
inated by an eﬀective point-record mechanism.
2.4 Authorities commitment
An important problem for the enforcement of point-record mechanisms arises
because the authorities may be tempted to deviate from their pre-announced
strategy. More explicitly, we have postulated that reckless driving entails a
cost to society and that careful driving is socially beneficial. This assumption
was expressed through the inequalities w0 < w¯ < w1. At a given time, if
the population of individuals who have just lost their last point includes a
large proportion of type-1 drivers, then the authorities will have a short term
incentive not to enforce the rule and in fact not to deprive the drivers of
their licence. In what follows, we will show that this forbearance problem is
actually endemic when the population includes a small proportion of type-0
drivers, i.e. when λ is small.
Denote by ρe the probability that an individual who has just lost her
last point is a type-e driver. Bayes law gives
ρ0 =
λp0q0
λp0q0 + (1− λ)p1q1
(19)
and
ρ1 =
(1− λ)p1q1
λp0q0 + (1− λ)p1q1
. (20)
Consider a particular driver in this population of individuals who have
just lost their last point. Not revocating the driving licence of this individual
entails a positive expected social surplus if
ρ1(w1 − w¯)− ρ0(w¯ − w0) > 0
which, using (19) and (20), is equivalently expressed as λ < λs where
λs =
p1q1(w1 − w¯)
p1q1(w1 − w¯) + p0q0(w¯ − w0)
(21)
>
p1(w1 − w¯)
p1(w1 − w¯) + p0(w¯ − w0)
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using q1 > q0. When the proportion of reckless drivers is lower than λs,
the lack of credibility may jeopardize the enforcement of the optimal point-
record mechanism since the authorities are tempted to be too clement in the
application of the law. In other words, the forbearance problem is particu-
larly acute when reckless drivers are concentrated in a small, but dangerous,
subset of the population. The lower bound on λs suggests that the inequal-
ity λ < λs may well be satisfied in practice, so that forbearance is not a
purely theoretical consideration. Assume for instance (just for illustrative
purposes) that p0 = 5p1 and w¯−w0 = w1 − w¯, i.e. the probability of losing
a point per unit of time is five times larger for a reckless driver than for a
normal driver, with the social cost of reckless driving being equal to the so-
cial surplus of normal driving. Then λs is larger than 0.166. In such a case,
if the reckless drivers amount to, say, 10% of the total population, then the
authorities would have an incentive to deviate from the optimal mechanism.
This commitment problem gives legitimacy to procedures (such as the
one recently implemented in France) where the loss of the last point entails
the cancelling of the driving licence automatically, without any additional
appraisal of the pros and cons of this decision for a particular driver. In
other words, for the sake of credibility, the authorities in charge of the en-
forcement of the point-record mechanism should not be given the possibility
to appraise the desirability of the cancelling of a driving licence, given the
available information about the past history of the driver (e.g. whether she
has been previously involved in an accident or whether the cancelling of the
driving licence may lead the individual to lose her job). Automaticity of the
mechanism should be the rule. The following Proposition summarizes these
results.
Proposition 4. The enforcement of the optimal point-record mechanism
requires a commitment of the authorities when λ < λs. In that case, the
Government should use automatic licence cancelling procedures in order to
commit to cancel the driving licence of the individuals who lose their last
point.
3 More general point-record mechanisms
In this section, we first extend our approach to analyze “redemptive” sys-
tems, where drivers can redeem points if they are not indicted during a given
duration. We show that redemptive point-record licences allow for a better
screening of individuals. Indeed, regaining points is more diﬃcult for reck-
less drivers than for sane individuals. We then turn to probationary licences,
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a special feature for new drivers. With these systems, new drivers have to
demonstrate their ability to drive during a probationary period before being
granted a full credit of points. This transient phase helps the authorities to
discriminate between dangerous and normal drivers. It may be completed
with a reduced-credit licence for beginners who fail to cross the transient
phase without indictment. We analyze such systems, and demonstrate that
they increase the social welfare.
3.1 Redemptive mechanisms
This section is devoted to systems where drivers are reinstated with a fresh
record after a time-period of length M without driving oﬀence. Let un(t)
be the expected utility of a normal driver who has got n points for a time
t. The redemption feature of the system implies that un(M) = uN for all
n ∈ {1, . . . , N −1}. For a driver whose point-record is equal to n < N since
a time-period t < M , we thus have
un(t) =
Z M−t
0
p1e
−p1τ
µZ τ
0
(v¯ − k)e−rt0dt0 + u0n−1e−rτ
¶
dτ (22)
+ e−p1(M−t)
µZ M−t
0
(v¯ − k)e−rt0dt0 + e−r(M−t)uN
¶
where u0n−1 ≡ un−1(0) denotes the utility of a driver who has just been in-
dicted and whose record, previously equal to n, has thus just been decreased
from one point. The first term of (22) corresponds to the driver’s expected
utility in case she’s caught committing an infringement during the redemp-
tion period while the second term is the utility she enjoys if she crosses the
period without committing an oﬀence. Computing the integrals in (22) gives
un(t) =
v¯ − k + p1u0n−1
r + p1
γ(M − t) + [1− γ(M − t)]uN (23)
where
γ(t) ≡ 1− e−(r+p1)t (24)
Observe that contrary to the previous section, the expected lifetime util-
ity of a n-point record driver with n < N evolves over time. (23) defines a
recursive equation between lifetime utilities of drivers who have just been
indicted (i.e., for whom t = 0) for all n ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}. In other words,
for t = 0, (23) gives u0n as a function of u
0
n−1 and uN . Using u
0
0 = σ1(T )uN
allows us to solve this recursive equation.
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Lemma 3. The expected utility un(t) of a driver who has got n points for
a period of length t, with t < M , is given by (23) where
u0n =
aγ(M)[1− σ1(T )bNγ(M)N − bnγ(M)n(1− σ1(T ))]
[1− bγ(M)][1− bNγ(M)Nσ1(T )]− [1− γ(M)][1− bNγ(M)N ]
(25)
for all n ∈ {1, . . . ,N}, with a ≡ (v¯ − k)/(r + p1), b ≡ p1/(r + p1) and
u00 = σ1(T )uN . un(t) increases with n for all t ≤ M and u0n(t) > 0 for all
t < M .
Not surprisingly, the driver’s utility increases over time within a category
and is greater the larger the point-record. As γ(+∞) = 1, (25) converges to
(5) as M → +∞.
Focusing on eﬀective point-record systems, it must be the case that
un(t) ≥ u˜n(t, ε) for all t < M, ε > 0 and n ≤ N , where u˜n(t, ε) corre-
sponds to the expected utility of a driver who decides to not exert any eﬀort
during period [0, ε] with ε < M − t, provided she is not indicted. We have
u˜n(t, ε) =
Z ε
0
p0e
−p0τ
µZ τ
0
v¯e−rt
0
dt0 + e−rτu0n−1
¶
dτ
+ e−p0ε
µZ ε
0
v¯e−rt
0
dt0 + e−rεun(t+ ε)
¶
which has the same interpretation as (6) and simplifies to
u˜n(t, ε) = un(t+ ε)−
h
1− e−(p0+r)ε
i run(t+ ε)− v¯ + p0[un(t+ ε)− u0n−1]
p0 + r
Since u˜n(t, 0) = un(t), a necessary condition for the point-record mech-
anism to be eﬀective is given by ∂u˜n(t,ε)∂ε
¯¯¯
ε=0
≤ 0 or equivalently
run(t) ≥ v¯ − p0[un(t)− u0n−1] + u0n(t) for all n and all t < M. (26)
Under (26), we have ∂u˜n(t, ε)/∂ε ≤ 0 if 0 ≤ ε ≤ M − t. (26) is thus a
necessary and suﬃcient eﬀectiveness condition. Diﬀerentiating (23) gives
run(t) = v¯ − k − p1[un(t)− u0n−1] + u0n(t)
for all n. Hence, (26) simplifies to
un(t)− u0n−1 ≥ k/(p0 − p1) (27)
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which must be satisfied for all n ≤ N and all t ≤ M . Since un(t) increases
with t, (27) reduces to
u0n − u0n−1 ≥ k/(p0 − p1)
for all n ≤ N . Using (25), one checks that u0n − u0n−1 decreases with n.
Consequently, (27) holds for all n and t provided that it holds for n = N
and t = 0 which leads to the condition
v¯ − k
k
p0 − p1
p1
≥ γ(M)
−N (1 + r/p1)N − σ1(T )
1− σ1(T )
− [1− γ(M)][b
−Nγ(M)−N − 1]
[1− bγ(M)](1− e−rT )
(28)
which is the extension of (10) to the case of redemptive mechanisms. As
γ(+∞) = 1, the right hand side of (28) converges to ψ(N,T ) as M → +∞.
To perform the welfare analysis, we also have to determine the qe pro-
portions of type-e drivers entitled to drive. Here also we restrict attention
to steady states. However, compared to non-redemptive systems, drivers
records are not evenly distributed among the N categories of active drivers,
and (13) does not hold. The steady state proportions are derived as follows.
Since the same reasoning applies for each drivers’ type, neglect drivers’ types
for the moment and remove subscript e. Denote by q the steady state pro-
portion of active drivers of the type considered and by qn(t)dt the proportion
of active drivers who have been in the n points category for a length of time
t0 ∈ [t, t + dt], with q0n = qn(0) and qn(t) = q0ne−pt. At a steady state, we
have q0n−1 = q
0
n(1 − e−pM) for all n = 1, ..., N − 1 and q0N−1 = q0N which
gives8
q0n = q
0
N(1− e−pM)N−1−n for all n = 1, ...,N − 1. (29)
We may write
q0N = (1− q)η/T +
N−1X
n=1
qn(M) (30)
with η = η0 or η1 according to the drivers’ type, since in addition to the η/T
fraction of the suspended 1 − q drivers who pass examinations, all drivers
lucky enough to not have been convicted during the redemption period get
a fresh record.
8Indeed for all n = 1, ...,N−1, a proportion 1−e−pM of n-point drivers will ultimately
join the (n − 1)-point group, while the other ones will redeem a fresh record. Similarly,
all N-point drivers will ultimately join the (N − 1)-point group.
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Finally, the total proportion of individuals (of a given type) allowed to
drive is given by
q =
N−1X
n=1
Z M
0
qn(t)dt+
Z ∞
0
qN(t)dt (31)
which, after some straightforward computations involving (29) and (30),
gives the following result
Lemma 4. The qe fraction of active type-e drivers is given by
qe =
1
1 + y(N, e−peM)peT/ηe
(32)
where
y(N,x) ≡ (1− x)
N−1x
1− (1− x)N
with ∂y/∂x < 0 and y(N, 0) = 1/N .
As intuition suggests, since ∂y/∂x < 0 the proportion of active drivers
increases when the length of the redemption period decreases. Intuition also
suggests that non-redemptive systems are peculiar cases of redemptive ones,
when the required period to redeem points is infinitely long. As y(N,x)→
1/N when x→ 0, this is eﬀectively the case since qe given by (32) coincides
with (14) when M goes to infinity.
The optimal eﬀective point-record mechanism (N∗, T ∗,M∗) maximizes
the social welfare (12) with respect to N , T and M , with proportions of
licenced drivers given by (32) for e = 0 and 1, subject to the incentive
constraint (28). A non-redemptive system would be optimal if choosing M
infinitely large were optimal. The following proposition shows that this is
not the case.
Proposition 5. The optimal driver-record system is redemptive, i.e. M∗ ¿
+∞.
Redemptive mechanisms are optimal because they act as a screening
device. Indeed, it is more diﬃcult for reckless drivers to redeem points than
for normal individuals. A redemptive clause reduces the incentive power
of the point-record mechanism, but this eﬀect may be compensated by an
increase in T or a decrease in N . In particular, when M is very large but
finite, incentives can be preserved through a small increase in T . Starting
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from an optimal non-redemptive mechanism (i.e. M = +∞), such a small
increase in T entails a second-order eﬀect on welfare, while the screening
eﬀect of the redemption clause is first-order. On the whole, the scales are
tipped in favour of the redemptive mechanism.
3.2 Probationary licences
We now complete the analysis by introducing the renewal of the popula-
tion and complementing the regulation with probationary drivers’ licence
systems. For simplicity, we only consider non-redemptive systems in this
section.
Assume that the population is renewed over time at rate π, and that new
drivers are given a temporary allowance to drive during period L. Over this
transient phase, they have to demonstrate that they deserve to be entitled
a normal licence (N,T ) by not defaulting driving rules. Should they be
convicted during this time, they will have a specific licence for the rest of
their lives with R points and a deprivation period T 0, beginning by R − 1
points at the time they are caught defaulting. We thus consider two possible
driving licences: (N,T ) or (R,T 0).
Let u(`) denote the expected utility of a `-old normal driver, (with ` < L)
who has never been convicted so far. Let also uˆr denote the expected utility
of a normal driver who was convicted during the probationary period -
she thus has at most R points - and who has a r-point record (with r ∈
{0, . . . , R}). uˆr is deduced from (5) by substituting R to N , T 0 to T and r
to n. For a young driver, we have9
u(`) =
Z L−`
0
p1e
−p1τ
µZ τ
0
(v − k)e−rt0dt0 + uˆR−1e−rτ
¶
dτ (33)
+ e−p1(L−`)
µZ L−`
0
(v − k)e−rt0dt0 + uNe−r(L−`)
¶
for all ` < L. Since the driver gets a normal licence with N points if she has
not been convicted during her probationary period, we also have u(L) = uN .
Integrating (33) and using the fact that uˆr satisfies an equation similar to
(2) for all r ≤ R gives
u(`) = uN − γ(L− `)(uN − uˆR) (34)
9Compared to the previous sections, the relevant discount rate accounts for the prob-
ability of death, i.e. r = rˆ + π where rˆ denotes the psychological discount rate of an
individual who never dies.
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The expected utility of a novice is thus equal to a N-point experienced
driver’s utility diminished by the expected loss of being convicted during
(the rest of) the probationary period. This utility increases over time during
the probationary period, i.e. we have u0(`) > 0 for all ` < L.
A record system with a probationary period is eﬀective if, in addition to
satisfy (10) for (N,T ) and (R,T 0), it also induces new drivers to exert an
eﬀort before they get their final licence. Using developments that parallel
those exposed in the previous section allows us to show that eﬀectiveness
requires
v¯ − k − p1[u(`)− uˆR−1] + u0(`) ≥ v¯ − p0[u(`)− uˆR−1] + u0(`)
for all ` < L. Rearranging terms and using the fact that u(`) is increasing
leads to
u(0)− uˆR−1 ≥ k/(p0 − p1) (35)
The following lemma establishes that new normal drivers choose to drive
carefully when old normal drivers do so.
Lemma 5. Condition (35) is satisfied whenever the (R,T 0) point-record li-
cence system is eﬀective.
To perform the welfare analysis, we have to determine the qe proportions
of type-e drivers entitled to drive. Because of the renewal of the population,
drivers records are not evenly distributed among the diﬀerent categories of
active drivers and (13) does not apply. Let qen and qˆ
e
r denote the proportions
of (experienced) type-e active drivers whose records belong to the n points
category (among N) or to the r points category (among R) respectively. Let
also eqe(`)d` be the proportion of t-old type-e drivers who have never been
convicted, with t ∈ [`, `+ d`] and 0 ≤ ` ≤ L. We have
qe =
Z L
0
eqe(`)d`+ NX
n=1
qen +
RX
r=1
qˆer
i.e., active drivers are either new drivers in their probationary phases, or
older drivers with a strictly positive record belonging to one of the two
licence’ types.
Lemma 6. The proportion of active type-e drivers (e = 0 or 1) is given by
qe = e
−(π+pe)LΦ(pe, N, T ) + [1− e−(π+pe)L]Φ(pe, R, T 0) (36)
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where
Φ(pe, A,B) ≡
1− ( pepe+π )
A
1− βe(B)( pepe+π )
A
βe(B) =
ηee−πB
1− (1− ηe)e−πB
for A = N or R and B = T or T 0.
The optimal eﬀective driver-record system is determined by the values
N∗, R∗, T ∗ and T 0∗ that maximize the social welfare subject to eﬀectiveness
constraints (10) and with the proportions of active drivers given by (36).
Proposition 6. Probationary driving licences are optimal.
Here also, probationary licences increase the social welfare because they
act as a screening device. The probationary period allows the government to
discriminate between drivers who have or have not been caught infringing
the road regulation. Indeed, Bayes law shows that the probability of a
driver to be a type-0 is larger in the first group than in the second one
and consequently the driving licence should be diﬀerent according to the
infraction experience in the probationary period.
4 Severe driving oﬀences and licence deprivation
Till now we have restricted attention to a single category of road infringe-
ments. This section extends our model to the case where driving oﬀences
are diverse in their nature and may be more or less acute depending of their
intensity.
Denote by s ∈ [0, 1] the seriousness of a driving oﬀence. s is random
and depends on the behavior of the driver. Conditionally on being spot-
ted by the police for a driving oﬀence, s is distributed over [0, 1] according
to cumulative distribution Fe(s) and density function fe(s) = F
0
e(s) > 0
for all s ∈ (0, 1). Hence Fe(s) is the probability that the seriousness of
the driving oﬀence is less than s when a type-e driver is caught commit-
ting an oﬀence. This distribution satisfies the Monotone Likelihood Ratio
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Property (MLRP), i.e. f0(s)/f1(s) increases with s.
10 Hence, the larger the
seriousness of the oﬀence, the larger the likelihood that such an oﬀence is
committed by a reckless driver (e = 0) relative to the likelihood that the
oﬀender is a normal driver (e = 1). As we will show, it may then be socially
optimal to directly deprive drivers from their licences when they commit
very serious driving oﬀences. We shall investigate this possibility by con-
sidering regulations that involve two seriousness thresholds, s0 and s00 with
0 ≤ s0 < s00 ≤ 1. These thresholds determine the number of points lost by
a driver caught committing an infringement. When s ∈ [0, s0) the driver’s
record is unchanged, whereas it is reduced by one point if s ∈ [s0, s00) and
set to zero for more severe infringements: the driver is thus deprived from
her licence for all s ∈ [s00, 1].
Let πedt be the probability that a type-e driver is caught committing an
oﬀence during an infinitesimal time period of length dt, with π0 > π1 > 0.
π0 and π1 are determined by the frequency of police control. They are
considered as given parameters in the present analysis. The driver loses
at least one point with probability pe(s
0)dt where pe(s0) ≡ πe[1 − Fe(s0)].
Denote by µe(s
0, s00) = [Fe(s00)−Fe(s0)]/[1−Fe(s0)] the probability of losing
one point once convicted. A convicted type-e driver with a point credit larger
than 1 is directly deprived of her licence with probability 1− µe(s0, s00). We
have µe(s
0, 1) = 1 and µe(s0, s00) < 1 whenever s00 < 1.
With such a point-record mechanism, the expected utility of a n-point
careful driver satisfies
run = v¯ − k − p1[µ1(un − un−1) + (1− µ1)(un − u0)]
which diﬀers from (3) since the driver, once convicted, may lose one point
with probability µ1 or all her points with probability 1 − µ1. Similarly to
(7), the expected utility of a n-point driver who chooses not to exert any
eﬀort during the time interval [0, ε], ε > 0 is given by
u˜n(ε) = un − [1− e−(p0+r)ε]
run − v¯ + p0[µ0(un − un−1) + (1− µ0)(un − u0)]
p0 + r
10In practice, driving oﬀences may be characterized by a multidimensional random vec-
tor Z = (z1, z2, ..., zL). Each component zh of Z corresponds to a specific characterization
of the road infringement, say speed, alcohol level, risky driving, bad state of the car,...
Following Milgrom (1981), as long as two random vectors are comparable (they either lead
to equivalent posterior beliefs about the driver’s eﬀort or one is more “favorable” than the
other in increasing posterior beliefs), we can find a suﬃcient statistic for Z (that we call
seriousness) with support [0, 1] and with densities that have strict MLRP.
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Using these expressions allows us to write the eﬀectiveness condition (i.e.
u˜n(ε) ≤ un for all ε > 0 and all n = 1, ..., N) as
φ(s0, s00, n,N, T ) ≥ k
a[1− σ1(T )]
for all n = 1, ...,N (37)
where
φ(s0, s00, n,N, T ) ≡ b
n−1µn−11 [p0(µ0 − µ1b)− p1µ1(1− b)]− p1(1− µ1) + p0(1− µ0)
1− bµ1 − σ1(T )[b(1− µ1) + bNµN1 (1− b)]
To investigate whether the direct revocation of driving licence is socially
optimal, consider stationary equilibria. The proportion of active type-e
drivers satisfies qen = peµeq
e
n+1+(1−pe)qen for n ∈ {1, . . . , N−1}, since type-e
drivers lose one point with probability peµe per unit of time and they are not
convicted with probability 1− pe. Consequently qen = µeqen+1 which implies
qe ≡
PN
n=1 q
e
n = qN(1−µNe )/(1−µe). Moreover, at a stationary equilibrium
the flow of drivers reinstated equals the number of N -point drivers who lose
either one or all their points, i.e., we must have ηe(1− qe)/T = peqeN . This
condition leads to
qe =
1
1 + peT/ηez(µe, N)
where
z(µ,N) =
1− µ
1− µN
The stationary social welfare (12) can then be written as
λ
w0 − w¯ + c/T
1 + p0(s0)T/η0z0(µ0(s0, s00),N)
+ (1− λ) w1 − w¯ + c/T
1 + p1(s0)T/η1z0(µ1(s0, s00),N)
+ w¯ − c/T
(38)
ant the optimal mechanism maximizes (38) with respect to 0 ≤ s0 ≤ s00 ≤
1, T ≥ 0,N ∈ N∗ subject to the incentive constraints (37). It is shown in
the appendix that
Proposition 7. Ceteris paribus, when f0(1)/f1(1) is large enough, the op-
timal point-record mechanism is such that s00 < 1.
Proposition 7 states a suﬃcient condition for the optimal mechanism to
be such that s00 < 1: ceteris paribus f0(1)/f1(1) should be large enough.11
11The lower bound of f0(1)/f1(1) above which s
00 < 1 is optimal is given in the proof
of the Proposition.
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This is a very intuitive condition: the Government is justified in revocating
the driving licence in the cases of very serious oﬀences that are strongly
informative on the driving behavior. Indeed, in such cases the advantages of
incapacitating reckless drivers prevails over the disadvantages of imposing
an exaggeratedly strong penalty on some normal drivers who (say in a mo-
mentary lapse of concentration) may have committed a very serious driving
oﬀence.
5 Conclusion
This paper has shown that point-record driving licences are beneficial for so-
ciety for two reasons: They force normal drivers to drive more safely (at any
time with eﬀective mechanisms) and the removal of the licence aﬄicts more
often reckless drivers than sane individuals. In other words, point-record
mechanisms act simultaneously as a deterring device and as a screening and
incapacitating device. In our model there exists an optimal point-record
system, but its eﬃciency may be jeopardized by a forbearance problem. We
also have shown that redemptive mechanisms and probationary periods are
welfare improving because they strengthen the screening of drivers in a use-
ful way. Finally, the government has good grounds for the direct revocation
of driving licences in the cases of very serious oﬀences.
Of course, this analysis has been developed in a highly simplified model
and extending our results to a more realistic framework would be particu-
larly useful. Such an extension may involve several types of driving-related
oﬀences with point endorsement on the licence according to their gravity.
Some oﬀences may be concentrated on reckless drivers (e.g. alcohol at the
wheel) and others may concern a larger number of individuals (e.g. excess
speed). The interaction between screening and incentives may thus be dif-
ferent according to the type of the oﬀence, which aﬀects the scale of point
penalties.
Another important extension would be to study the relationship be-
tween point records and other deterring mechanisms, especially fines and
insurance experience rating. Note that insurance rating may also depend on
the drivers’ point-record, which extends the range of the point-record as an
incentive device.12
12See Dionne (2000) on the system implemented in Que´bec.
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Appendix
A Properties of point-records mechanisms
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
(2) can be written as
un = a+ bun−1 (39)
where
a ≡ v¯ − k
r + p1
> 0 (40)
and
b ≡ p1
r + p1
< 1 (41)
Solving (39) for un gives
un =
a
1− b(1− b
n) + bnu0
Using (39) and (4), a fresh record driver thus enjoys
uN =
a
1− b(1− b
N ) + bNσ1(T )uN
=
a
1− b
1− bN
1− bNσ1(T )
,
and a driver deprived of her licence gets
u0 =
a
1− b
α1(T )(1− bN)
1− bNσ1(T )
,
which gives
un =
a
1− b
·
1− bn
µ
1− σ1(T )(1− b
N)
1− bNσ1(T )
¶¸
=
a
1− b
·
1− bn 1− σ1(T )
1− bNσ1(T )
¸
hence (5).
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Let Eb > 0 and Ec > 0 denote the instantaneous net external benefits
of cautious driving (e = 1) and the net external costs of reckless driving
(e = 0) respectively. Denotes also by Ed the net external costs of not
being allowed to drive and by ec the driving licence examination cost per
applicant. The lifetime expected utility of a reckless driver with n points,
with n ∈ {1, ..., N}, can be derived following the same reasoning as in Lemma
1 and is given by
u0n =
v¯
r
·
1− (b0)n 1− σ0(T )
1− (b0)Nσ0(T )
¸
(42)
with b0 ≡ p0/(r + p0). At steady state, the proportion of type-e drivers
with n points is equal to qe/N for all n = 1, ..., N , with expected util-
ity u0n for e = 0 and un for e = 1. The proportion of type-1 individuals
who are deprived of their licence is 1 − q1. A proportion η1(1 − η1)θ−1
of these individuals make the examination θ times before succeeding. The
expected utility of the individuals who are deprived of their licence is thus
uN
P∞
θ=1 η1(1−η1)θ−1e−r(θT−t) where t denotes the time spent since she has
lost her last point or she has made the examination. Among these individ-
uals, t is uniformy distributed over [0, 1]. The same also applies for type-0
individuals with η0, u0N instead of η1, uN . External eﬀects and examination
cost included, the steady state social welfare is written as
W = λ
(
q0
Ã
NX
n=1
u0n
N
− Ec
r
!
+(1− q0)
"
u0N
∞X
θ=1
η0(1− η0)θ−1
Z T
0
1
T
e−r(θT−t)dt− (ec/T ) +Ed
r
#)
+ (1− λ)
(
q1
Ã
NX
n=1
un
N
+
Eb
r
!
+(1− q1)
"
uN
∞X
θ=1
η1(1− η1)θ−1
Z T
0
1
T
e−r(θT−t)dt− (ec/T ) +Ed
r
#)
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which after integrating, simplifies to
W = λ
(
q0
Ã
NX
n=1
u0n
N
− Ec
r
!
+ (1− q0)
µ
η0
rT
[1− σ0(T )]u0N −
(ec/T ) +Ed
r
¶)
+ (1− λ)
(
q1
Ã
NX
n=1
un
N
+
Eb
r
!
+ (1− q1)
µ
η1
rT
[1− σ1(T )]uN −
(ec/T ) +Ed
r
¶)
Using (5) and (42) leads to
W = λ
½
q0
v −Ec
r
− (1− q0)
(ec/T ) +Ed
r
¾
+ (1− λ)
½
q1
v − k +Eb
r
− (1− q1)
(ec/T ) +Ed
r
¾
Defining w0 = (v −Ec)/r,w1 = (v − k+Eb)/r, w¯ = −Ed/r and c = ec/r
gives (12).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Condition (10) can be restated as
ϕ(T ) ≥ N (43)
where
ϕ(T ) ≡ ln[K − α1(T )(K − 1)]/ ln(1 + r/p1).
with
K =
v¯ − k
k
p0 − p1
p1
≥ 1 + r/p1
under (11). Under (11), there exists T ≥ 0 and N ≥ 1 such that (43)
holds. Hence eﬀective driver-record mechanisms exist. Let us first check
that ϕ(T ) < N + 1 if (N,T ) is an optimal eﬀective mechanism. ϕ(T ) is
increasing and concave, with ϕ(0) = 0 and using α1(T )→ 0 when T → +∞
gives
ϕ(+∞) ≡ lim
T→∞
ϕ(T ) = ln(K)/ ln(1 + r/p1) > 1.
If ϕ(T ) ≥ N + 1, then (N,T ) is dominated by (N 0, T 0) with N 0 = N +
1, T 0 = (N + 1)T/N . Hence any optimal eﬀective mechanism is such that
N ≤ ϕ(T ) < N + 1.
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We may write W (N,T ) = cW (N/T, T ) with
cW (x, T ) ≡ λw0 − w¯ + c/T
1 + p0/η0x
+ (1− λ)w1 − w¯ + c/T
1 + p1/η1x
+ w¯ − c/T.
An optimal eﬀective driver-record mechanism maximizes W (eϕ(T ), T ) =cW (eϕ(T )/T, T ) with respect to T ≥ 0, where eϕ(T ) is the largest integer
inferior or equal to ϕ(T ). Using p0 > p1, η0 ≤ η1 and w1 > w¯ allows us to
write
cW (x, T ) > λw0 + (1− λ)w1 − w¯ − p0c/(xT )
1 + p0/η0x
+ w¯.
Hence
W (eϕ(T ), T ) > λw0 + (1− λ)w1 − w¯ − p0c/eϕ(T )
1 + p0T/η0 eϕ(T ) + w¯.
Assume
c <
η0 eϕ(+∞)[λw0 + (1− λ)w1 − w¯]
p0
≡ cˆ.
Then there exists T > 0 such that W (eϕ(T ), T ) > w¯. Furthermore, usingeϕ(T )/T → 0 when T −→ +∞ gives
lim
T−→+∞
W (eϕ(T ), T ) = cW (0,+∞) = w¯.
which proves that T → W (eϕ(T ), T ) reaches a maximum over R+ when
c < cˆ.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
We first begin by characterizing the sequence defined by (18). We have
Lemma 7. Let un be an infinite sequence defined by (18) for n = 1, 2, . . . ,+∞ with
u0 ≤ v/r. Then un is increasing, un − un−1 is decreasing and un → v/r as
n→ +∞.
Proof. Using (17), we have un > un−1 if un−1 > un−2 for all n ≥ 2, and it is
easy to show that u1 > u0 under the assumption u0 < v/r. Consequently,
the sequence un is increasing. (17) also implies that un ≤ v/r for all n. The
sequence un is thus increasing and upward bounded, hence it is converging
and (17) shows that its limits is v/r.
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Define xn ≡ un − un−1 for all n ≥ 2. (17) gives
(r + p1)xn +min{k, (p0 − p1)xn} = p1xn−1 +min{k, (p0 − p1)xn−1} (44)
The LHS of (44) is an increasing functions of xn. Likewise, the RHS of
(44) is an increasing function of xn−1. Consequently, (44) defines xn as an
increasing function of xn−1. Hence, we have xn ≥ xn−1 for all n ≥ 2 iﬀ
x2 ≥ x1. In other words, the sequence un − un−1 is monotonic with respect
to n. Because un converges to v/r and un is increasing, we deduce that
un − un−1 is decreasing.
We can now proceed to the proof of proposition 2
Proof. Let un, n ∈ {0, . . . , N} be a sequence of equilibrium expected utility
for the point-record mechanism (N,T ) with u0 ≤ v/r. For this sequence,
any optimal strategy of normal drivers is such that
sn =



1 if un − un−1 > k/(p0 − p1)
y ∈ [0, 1] if un − un−1 = k/(p0 − p1)
0 if un − un−1 < k/(p0 − p1).
The Proposition follows from the fact that un−un−1 is decreasing as shown
in Lemma 7.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Let W˜ be the social welfare for equilibrium mixed strategy and utility pro-
file s1, ..., sN , u1,...,uN associated with the point-record mechanism (N,T ).
Assume that (N,T ) is not an eﬀective mechanism. Proposition 2 implies
that there exists N∗ in {1, . . . , N − 1} and equilibrium strategy sn = 1 if
n ≤ N∗ and sn = 0 if n > N∗.13 We then have
W˜ = [λq0 + (1− λ)q1(1− f˜)]w0 + (1− λ)q1f˜w1
+ [λ(1− q0) + (1− λ)(1− q1)](w¯ − c/T )
where q0 and q1 are defined by (14) for e ∈ {0, 1}, and f˜ is the proportion of
individuals who choose e = 1 among the population of normal drivers who
are entitled to drive. We have
f˜ =
NX
n=1
fnsn
13Proposition 2 says that sN∗ ∈ [0, 1]. However if uN∗ − uN∗−1 = k/(p0 − p1) then
sN∗ = 1 is an equilibrium strategy. Otherwise N
∗ can be chosen such that {sn = 1 if
n ≤ N∗ and sn = 0 if n > N∗} is an equilibrium strategy.
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where fn denotes the proportion of n-points drivers among normal drivers
allowed to drive (i.e. who have at least one point). These proportions are
derived as follow. At steady states we have
(1− q1)η1/T = q1f1p˜1 = q1f2p˜2 = . . . = q1fN p˜N (45)
where p˜n = snp1 + (1 − sn)p0 is the instantaneous rate at which a n-point
normal driver is caught committing an infraction and thus loses a point.
Using
PN
n=1 fn = 1 gives
NX
n=1
fnp˜n
p˜n
= f1p˜1
NX
n=1
(1/p˜n) = 1
which yields
fn =
1/p˜nPN
m=1(1/p˜m)
for all n = 1, ...,N.
and using (45)
q1 =
η1/T
η1/T + f1p˜1
=
PN
n=1(1/p˜n)PN
n=1(1/p˜n) + T/η1
We thus have
f˜ =
PN
n=1 sn/p˜nPN
n=1(1/p˜n)
and
q1f˜ =
PN
n=1 sn/p˜nPN
n=1(1/p˜n) + T/η1
.
We also have
NX
n=1
sn/p˜n =
N∗X
n=1
1/p1 =
N∗
p1
and
NX
n=1
(1/p˜n) =
N∗X
n=1
(1/p1) +
NX
n=N∗+1
(1/p0)
= N∗/p1 + (N −N∗)/p0
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which yields
q1f˜ =
N∗/p1
N∗/p1 + (N −N∗)/p0 + T/η1
(46)
Let us show that (N∗, T ∗) is an eﬀective mechanism that dominates
(N,T ). The first step is to show that (N∗, T ) is eﬀective. Let u∗n, n ∈
{0, 1, . . . , N∗}, be a sequence of equilibrium life-time expected utility of a
normal driver for N∗, T . i.e. u∗n is defined by (18) with the boundary condi-
tion u∗0 = α1(T )u
∗
N∗ . Using the fact that (44) holds for all n = 1, . . . , N
∗ at
the same time for the sequences un and u
∗
n, we deduce that u
∗
N∗ − u∗N∗−1 ≥
uN∗ − uN∗−1 if and only if u∗1 − u∗0 ≥ u1 − u0 or equivalently, from (18), if
u∗0 ≤ u0. Since u∗0 = α1(T )u∗N∗ and u0 = α1(T )uN∗ , this condition is equiv-
alent to u∗N∗ ≤ uN , which is true because reducing the number of points
entails a decrease in the life-time expected utility of a normal driver with a
fresh record. Consequently u∗N∗ − u∗N∗−1 ≥ uN∗ − uN∗−1 ≥ k/(p0 − p1) and
thus (N∗, T ) is eﬀective. It remains to show that (N∗, T ) dominates (N,T ).
LetW ∗ be the social welfare under the (N∗, T ) mechanism and let q∗e be the
proportion of type-e individuals who are entitled to drive under (N∗, T ). q∗e
is given by (14) where N∗ is substituted to N , i.e.
q∗e =
N∗/pe
N∗/pe + T/ηe
Using (46) and N∗ < N shows that
q∗0 < q0 and q
∗
1 > q1
ef (47)
(12) gives
W ∗ = λ[w¯ − c/T − q∗0(w¯ − c/T − w0)] + (1− λ)[w¯ − c/T + q∗1(w1 − w¯ + c/T )]
(48)
Using (47), (48), w¯− c/T −w0 > 0 and w1− w¯+ c/T > 0 allows us to write
W ∗ > λ[w¯ − c/T − q0(w¯ − c/T − w0)]
+ (1− λ)[w¯ − c/T + q1f˜(w1 − w¯ + c/T )]
> λ[w¯ − c/T − q0(w¯ − c/T − w0)]
+ (1− λ)[w¯ − c/T + q1f˜(w1 − w¯ + c/T ) + q1(1− f˜)(w0 − w¯ + c/T )]
= W˜
which completes the proof.
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B Properties of redemptive mechanisms
B.1 Proof of Lemma 3
Setting t = 0 in (23) yields
u0n =
v¯ − k + p1u0n−1
r + p1
γ(M) + [1− γ(M)]uN for n = 0, ..., N. (49)
which gives
u0n = [a(γ(M)) + (1− γ(M))uN ]
1− bnγ(M)n
1− bγ(M) + b
nγ(M)nu0
Using u0 = σ1(T )uN along with u0N = uN yields
uN =
aγ(M)(1− bNγ(M)N)
[1− bγ(M)][1− bNγ(M)Nσ1(T )]− [1− γ(M)][1− bNγ(M)N ]
(50)
which in turn gives (25).
Diﬀerentiating (22), we obtain that
u0n(t) = (r + p1)[1− γ(M − t)](uN − a− bu0n−1)
As u0n is increasing in n, we have u
0
n(t) > 0 for all t < M if uN > a+ bu0
where u0 = σ1(T )uN , which leads to
uN >
a
1− bσ1(T )
Using (50), it is straightforward to verify that this condition is satisfied,
hence that u0n(t) > 0 for all t < M and n < N .
B.2 Proof of Lemma 4
(29) can be written as
q0n = q
0
N [1− x(M)]N−n−1
where x(M) ≡ e−pM and (30) simplifies to
q0N = (1− q)η/T + x(M)
N−1X
n=1
q0n
= (1− q)η/T + x(M)q0N
N−2X
n=0
[1− x(M)]n
= (1− q)η/T + {1− [1− x(M)]N−1}q0N
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which yields
q0N =
(1− q)η
T [1− x(M)]N−1 (51)
We also have Z +∞
0
qN(t)dt =
q0N
p
and
N−1X
n=1
Z M
0
qn(t)dt =
1− x(M)
p
N−1X
n=1
q0n
=
1− x(M)
p
q0N
N−2X
n=0
(1− x(M))n
=
1− x(M)
p
1− (1− x(M))N−1
x(M)
q0N
Consequently, (31) simplifies to
q =
q0N
p
µ
(1− x(M))1− (1− x(M))
N−1
x(M)
+ 1
¶
=
q0N
p
1− (1− x(M))N
x(M)
Collecting terms and simplifying give (32). Using (1−x)N =
PN
k=0(
k
N )(−x)N−k
where (kN ) = N !/[k!(N − k)!] yields
y(N,x) =
x
PN−1
k=0 (
k
N−1)(−x)N−1−k
1−
PN
k=0(
k
N )(−x)N−k
=
1
N
PN−1
k=0 (
k
N−1)(−x)N−1−kPN−1
k=0 (
k
N−1)(−x)N−k−1/(N − k)
which gives y(N, 0) = 1/N and using N ≥ 2
∂y
∂x
=
(1− x)N−2[1−Nx− (1− x)N ]
[1− (1− x)N ]2 < 0.
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B.3 Proof of Proposition 5
Denote by xe(M) ≡ e−peM for e = 0, 1. We have x0(M) = x1(M)ρ where
ρ = p0/p1 > 1 and using (24), we also have γ(M) = 1 − x1(M)µ where
µ = 1 + r/p1. Consequently, the social welfare (12) may be written as
W (N,T,X0(x1), x1) =
λ(w0 − w¯ + c/T )
1 + y(N,X0(x1))p0T/η0
+
(1− λ)(w1 − w¯ + c/T )
1 + y(N,x1)p1T/η1
+ w¯ − c/T
where X0(x) = x
ρ. (28) may be rewritten as
G(N,T, τ(x1)) ≥ 0
where τ(x) ≡ 1− xµ and G(·) is given by
G(N,T, τ) =
a
b
p0 − p1
k
− 1− τ(1− b)(1− b
NτN )
[1− bτ ](1− σ1(T ))bNτN
Define φ as
φ(x) = max
N,T
{W (N,T,X0(x), x) : G(N,T, τ(x)) ≥ 0}
Note that x1 goes to zero whenM goes to infinity. Hence the proposition
will be proved if we show that φ0(0) > 0. Using the envelope theorem allows
us to write
φ0(0) =
∂W (N,T, 0, 0)
∂x0
X 00(0) +
∂W (N,T, 0, 0)
∂x1
+ γ
∂G(N,T, 1, 0)
∂τ
τ 0(0)
where γ is the Kuhn and Tucker multiplier corresponding to (28).
We have
∂W (N,T, 0, 0)
∂x0
= −λ(w0 − w¯ + c/T )p0T/η0
[1 + y(N, 0)p0T/η0]2
∂y(N,T, 0)
∂x
where y(N,T, 0) = 1/N . A tedious calculation gives ∂y(N, 0)/∂x = −(N −
1)/2N and thus
∂W (N,T, 0, 0)
∂x0
=
λ(w0 − w¯ + c/T )p0T/η0
(1 + p0T/η0N)2
N − 1
2N
Similar computations give
∂W (N,T, 0, 0)
∂x1
=
(1− λ)(w1 − w¯ + c/T )p1T/η1
(1 + p1T/η1N)2
N − 1
2N
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Finally, using (28), straightforward computations give
∂G(N,T, 1)
∂τ
= −(1− b
N)(1−N)−NbN(1− b)2
[1− b][1− σ1(T )]bN
while
γ =
λ(w0 − w¯ + c/T )
(1 + p0T/η0N)2
p0T
η0N2
+
(1− λ)(w1 − w¯ + c/T )
(1 + p1T/η1N)2
p1T
η1N2
using (12) and (43). Since X 00(0) = τ 0(0) = 0, we thus have φ0(0) =
∂W (N,T, 0, 0)/∂x1 > 0 which completes the proof.
C Properties of probationary licences
C.1 Proof of Lemma 5
Using (34) for ` = 0 gives
u(0)− uˆR−1 = uN − γ(L)(uN − uˆR)− uˆR−1
= uˆR − uˆR−1 + [1− γ(L)](uN − uˆR)
≥ uˆR − uˆR−1
≥ k/(p0 − p1)
where the first inequality comes from uN ≥ uˆR and the last inequality comes
from R ≤ ϕ(T 0) when (R,T 0) is eﬀective.
C.2 Proof of Lemma 6
Given that drivers are renewed at rate π, we have
eqe(`) = πe−(π+pe)` (52)
The total proportion of new type-e drivers in probationary phase is thus
given by Z L
0
eqe(`)d` = π − eqe(L)
π + pe
At a steady state, the proportion of older drivers in each category is such
that the flow of incoming drivers compensates for the outgoing ones. We
thus have (π + pe)qen = peq
e
n+1 for n = 1, . . . , N − 1, which gives
qen = q
e
Nχ
N−n
e for n = 1, . . . , N − 1 (53)
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where χe = pe/(π + pe). Hence, we have
NX
n=1
qen = q
e
N
1− χNe
1− χe
The proportion of type-e drivers deprived of their licences since time t ∈
[θT, (θ + 1)T ), θ ∈ N is given by
qe0(θ, t) = peq
e
1(1− ηe)θ exp(−πt) (54)
and we also have
(π + pe)qeN = eqe(L) + ηe ∞X
θ=0
qe0(θ, (θ + 1)T )
Indeed, at steady states, the flow of successful beginners at the end of their
probationary phase and of old drivers who have passed examinations must
compensate for the disappearance of N points drivers who were either con-
victed or no longer alive.
Define
βe =
ηee−πT
1− (1− ηe)e−πT
We get
qeN =
eqe(L)
π + pe
+ βeqe1χe =
eqe(L)
π + pe
+ qeNχ
N
e βe
which gives
qeN =
eqe(L)
(π + pe)(1− βeχNe )
and thus
NX
n=1
qen =
eqe(L)/(π + pe)
1− βeχNe
1− χNe
1− χe
=
eqe(L)
π
1− χNe
1− βeχNe
Similarly, at a steady state we have qˆer = qˆ
e
R−1χ
R−1−r
e for r = 1, . . . , R− 2,
with
(π + pe)qˆ
e
R−1 = pe
µ
qˆeR +
Z L
0
eqe(`)d`¶
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since beginners who infringe rules are given a R-point licence only, with a
record already decreased of one point, and with
(π + pe)qˆ
e
R = peqˆ
e
1ηe
∞X
θ=0
(1− ηe)θ exp{−π(θ + 1)T 0}
Collecting terms gives
qˆeR = qˆ
e
R−1χ
R−1β0e
with β0e = ηe exp{−πT 0}/[1− (1− ηe) exp{−πT 0}], which yields
(π + pe)qˆeR−1 = pe
µ
qˆeR−1χ
R−1
e β
0
e +
Z L
0
eqe(`)d`¶
= pe
µ
qˆeR−1χ
R−1
e β
0
e +
π − eqe(L)
π + pe
¶
qˆeR−1(1− χRe β0e) = χe
π − eqe(L)
π + pe
qˆeR−1 =
χe(π − eqe(L))
(1− β0eχRe )(π + pe)
and thus
RX
r=1
qˆer = qˆ
e
R +
R−1X
r=1
qˆer
= β0eqˆ
e
R−1χ
R−1
e +
R−1X
r=1
qˆeR−1χ
R−1−r
e
=
χe(π − eqe(L))
(1− β0eχRe )(π + pe)
·
β0eχ
R−1
e +
π + pe
π
(1− χR−1e )
¸
=
π − eqe(L)
π
πβ0eχRe + pe(1− χR−1e )
(1− β0eχRe )(π + pe)
Finally,
qe =
π − eqe(L)
π + pe
+
eqe(L)
π
1− χNe
1− βeχNe
+
π − eqe(L)
π
πβ0eχRe + pe(1− χR−1e )
(1− β0eχR)(π + pe)
=
eqe(L)
π
1− χNe
1− βeχNe
+
π − eqe(L)
π
1− χRe
1− β0eχRe
.
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C.3 Proof of Proposition 6
Lemma 6 shows that the optimal point-record system maximizes
W = λ
n
e−(π+p0)L [Φ(p0,N, T )w0 + (1− Φ(p0,N, T ))(w − c/T )]
+ (1− e−(π+p0)L)
£
Φ(p0, R, T
0)w0 + (1−Φ(p0, R, T 0))(w − c/T )
¤o
+ (1− λ)
n
e−(π+p1)L [Φ(p1, N, T )w1 + (1− Φ(p1, N, T ))(w − c/T )]
+ (1− e−(π+p1)L)
£
Φ(p1, R, T
0)w1 + (1−Φ(p1, R, T 0))(w − c/T )
¤o
with respect to N,R ∈ N∗, T, T 0 ≥ 0, subject to N ≤ ϕ(T ) and R ≤ ϕ(T 0).
Let
µ = λe−(π+p0)L + (1− λ)e−(π+p1)L
eλ = λe−(π+p0)L
µ
eλ0 = λ(1− e−(π+p0)L)
1− µ
We may write
W = µ
neλ [Φ(p0, N, T )w0 + (1− Φ(p0, N, T ))(w − c/T )]
+ (1− eλ) [Φ(p1,N, T )w1 + (1− Φ(p1,N, T ))(w − c/T )]}
+ (1− µ)
neλ0 £Φ(p0, R, T 0)w0 + (1−Φ(p0, R, T 0))(w − c/T )¤
+ (1− eλ0) £Φ(p1, R, T 0)w1 + (1−Φ(p1, R, T 0))(w − c/T )¤ª
so that the maximisation problem can be decomposed in two separare sub-
problems. The first one determines N,T by maximizingeλ [Φ(p0, N, T )w0 + (1− Φ(p0, N, T ))(w − c/T )]
+ (1− eλ) [Φ(p1,N, T )w0 + (1− Φ(p1,N, T ))(w − c/T )]
subject to N ≤ ϕ(T ). The second subproblem gives R,T 0 by maximizingeλ0 £Φ(p0, R, T 0)w0 + (1− Φ(p0, R, T 0))(w − c/T )¤
+ (1− eλ0) £Φ(p1, R, T 0)w0 + (1− Φ(p1, R, T 0))(w − c/T )¤
subject to R ≤ ϕ(T 0). Observe that these two subproblems are identical
up to the parameter eλ in the first one, or eλ0 in the second one, and the
optimal solution depends on this parameter. p0 6= p1 implies eλ 6= eλ0 and
thus (N,T ) 6= (R,T 0).
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D Proof of Proposition 7
First observe that φ(s0, s00, n,N, T ) is decreasing in n when s00 is close to 1.
In that case, (37) holds for all n if
φ(s0, s00, N,N, T ) ≥ k
a[1− σ1(T )]
(55)
Lemma 8.
∂φ(s0, 1, N,N, T )
∂s00
< 0 when f0(1)/f1(1) is large enough.
Proof. Simple computations yield
∂φ(s0, 1, N,N, T )
∂s00
= f0(1)
µ
dφ(s0, 1, N,N, T )
dµ0
π0
pe
+
f1(1)
f0(1)
dφ(s0, 1, N,N, T )
dµ1
π1
pe
¶
where
dφ(s0, 1,N,N, T )
dµ0
≡ −p0(1− b
N−1)
(1− b)[1− σ1(T )bN ]
< 0
dφ(s0, 1, N,N, T )
dµ1
≡ b
N−1(p0 − p1)[N(1− b) + b(1− σ1(T ))]− (p0bN−1 − p1)[1− σ1(T )bN ]
(1− b)[1− σ1(T )bN ]2
> 0
We thus have
∂φ(s0, 1, N,N, T )
∂s00
< 0 if
f0(1)
f1(1)
> −dφ(s
0, 1, N,N, T )/dµ1
dφ(s0, 1, N,N, T )/dµ0
> 0
We can now proceed to the proof of proposition 7
Proof. Let W (s00, N) the value function of the maximization problem con-
strained by given values of s00 and N, with γ > 0 the multiplier associated
to (37) and let sˆ0, Tˆ and Nˆ be optimal values of s0, T and N when s00 is
fixed at s00 = 1. Using ze(1, N) = 1/N, ∂ze(1, N)/∂µ = −(N − 1)/(2N), the
envelope theorem yields
∂W (1, bN)
∂s00
=
Nˆ − 1
2Nˆ
Ã
λ(w0 − w¯ + c/Tˆ )
[1 + p0(sˆ0)Tˆ /(η0Nˆ)]2
π0Tˆ f0(1)
η0
+
(1− λ)(w1 − w¯ + c/Tˆ )
[1 + p1(sˆ0)Tˆ /(η1Nˆ)]2
π1Tˆ f1(1)
η1
!
+ γ
∂φ(sˆ0, 1, Nˆ , Nˆ , Tˆ )
∂s00
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Note that Tˆ ≥ T and thus w0 − w¯ + c/Tˆ < 0. Hence the bracketed term in
the previous formula is negative if
f0(1)
f1(1)
≥ Aˆ ≡ −1− λ
λ
w1 − w¯ + c/Tˆ
w0 − w¯ + c/Tˆ
Ã
η1Nˆ + p1(sˆ0)Tˆ
η0Nˆ + p0(sˆ0)Tˆ
!2
π0
π1
η0
η1
> 0
Using the previous Lemma, a suﬃcient condition for ∂W (1, bN)/∂s00 is then
given by
f0(1)
f1(1)
> max
(
Aˆ,−dφ(sˆ
0, 1, Nˆ , Nˆ , Tˆ )/dµ1
dφ(sˆ0, 1, Nˆ , Nˆ , Tˆ )/dµ0
)
which is a suﬃcient condition for the optimal value of s00 to be less than
1.
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u0
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uN−1
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τ1 τ2 τN−1 τN τN + T τ 01
-
Figure 1: Drivers’ utility. The driver loses a first point at t = τ1, a second
one at t = τ2, ... Her licence is revocated at t = τN and she recovers it first
time round at t = τN + T .
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